We present a symbolic decision procedure for time-sensitive cryptographic protocols. We consider protocols described in a process algebra-like notation that includes clocks, time-stamps and time variables. While the values of all clocks increase with rate one when time passes, time variables are simply variables that range over the time domain and can be used to remember time-stamps, i.e. time values. Our symbolic decision procedure deals with secrecy, authentication and any property that can be described as a safety property. Our approach is based on a logic representation of sets of configurations that combines a decidable logic with time constraints.
Introduction
Some cryptographic protocols rely upon timestamps that recipients use to verify timeliness of the message and recognize and reject replays of messages communicated in the past. Timestamps are also used in conjunction with short term keys. The presence of timestamps makes the specification and verification of cryptographic protocols a challenging problem. Indeed, most of the existing verification methods and decidability results for cryptographic protocols consider time-independent protocols [29, 26, 3, 5, 23, 17, 12, 13] . Because of the subtleties and complexity of the verification of time-dependent protocols, theorem provers have been used to verify such protocols.
In this paper, we present a model for time-dependent cryptographic protocols and a corresponding decidability result. Although, the model we present only deals with bounded protocols, that is, when a fixed number of sessions are considered, our model clearly identifies the main ingredients to be included in a general model. It is well-known that the verification problem of unbounded cryptographic protocols is undecidable in the untimed case, and hence, it is so for the timed case. Besides general models for distributed systems that can be used to model security protocols such as Timed CSP and MSR (multiset rewriting over first-order atomic formulae), we do not know about a model for timed cryptographic protocols.
To model timed cryptographic protocols, we include in our model clocks, time variables and timestamps. Clocks are variables that range over the time domain and advance with the same rate as time. Each agent has its own set of clocks that he can reset. That is clocks can be used to measure the time that elapses between two events, for instance, sending a message and receiving the corresponding response. Also, we allow a global clock that is never reset and that can be read and tested by all participants. Time variables correspond to timestamps in received messages. Such values can be stored and used together with clocks to put conditions on the acceptance of a message.
A second contribution of this paper is a complete and sound symbolic verification algorithm for timed cryptographic protocols. We consider a rich class of reachability properties that allow to specify confidentiality and authentication. In fact, we introduce a logic that allows to describe secrecy, equalities between terms and control points. Then, given a bounded protocol and two formulae in this logic ¡ and ¢ , the reachability problem we consider is whether there is a run of that starts in a configuration that satisfies ¡ and reaches a configuration that satisfies ¢ . We devise a symbolic algorithm that given a property described by a formula ¢ in this logic and given a bounded protocol computes the set of configurations that reaches ¢ . This algorithm uses symbolic constraints (logic formulae) to describe sets of configurations. The logic we introduce combines constraints on the knowledge of the intruder with time constraints on clock values and time variables. To show effectiveness of our verification method we show:
1. that for each action of our model we can express the predecessor configurations of a set of configurations as a formula. We consider input, output and time actions.
2. Then, we show decidability of the satisfiability problem for our logic.
Related work
Our model is clearly inspired by timed automata and our verification method influenced by the work on symbolic verification of timed automata and temporal logics for real-time systems (e.g. [1, 19, 2, 6] ). The results of this paper provide an algorithm for checking security properties (confidentiality and authentication) of timed cryptographic protocols. It has several interesting aspects:
1. it covers other properties than confidentiality (secrecy); indeed while other methods rely on an ad hoc reduction of authentication properties to secrecy, our method is directly applicable.
. As usual, function symbols of arity 0 are called constant symbols. 
The Protocol and Intruder Model
We describe in this section the model of cryptographic protocols adopted in this paper. We assume Dolev-Yao's intruder model except that, since we are dealing with timed protocols, we add rules that: 1. allow the derivation of any time stamp and 2. allow the derivation of any short-term key It is important to understand the difference between these three disjoint sets of variables: a time stamp is just a constant; clocks and time variables are variables. The difference is that the value of a clock advances with rate one with time while the value of a time variable does not. A time variable is simply a variable that ranges over the time domain.We fix the time domain to be the set of non-negative real numbers. Our results, however, hold also when we consider the natural numbers instead.
We consider two disjoint non-empty sets of keys: 
Process model
Timed cryptographic protocols are build from timed actions. Here, we consider two types of actions: message input and message output. A time constraint is associated to an action and describes when the action is possible. . Notice that the decomposition rules in the intruder model can be considered as a set of term transducers the intruder can apply to get new terms. As it will become clear later, a run of a CP provides the intruder with new term transducer she (he) can apply to learn new terms.
The main modality of the logic we use can be defined as follows: 
Closure of sets of secrets
In this section, we define when a set of messages is closed. Closed sets of secrets enjoy the property that they are not derivable by composition. Intuitively, a set of messages is closed, if it contains, for any message h in the set, all messages along at least one path of the tree representing the message h . The same idea is used in e.g. [24, 29, 14] . Let @ be a set of sets of messages and let h be a message. We use the notation:
We define when a set of messages is closed. For convenience of notations, we extend the set of formulae TSPL as follows:
The semantics of the newly introduced formulae is: 
Notations We use the notations 
$
as the classical logical implication (it can be easily defined in TSPL logic using set inclusion).
Well-formed formulae. We extend now the notion of closure of sets of messages to sets of extended terms. The definition is similar except that we have to consider two new cases: 1.) the case of a term is well-formed for ¡ ¢ sets of messages, is now easily extended to sets of extended terms. As now we are dealing with formulae, we have to define when a formula is well-formed in the same sense. well-formed, such that
The main property satisfied by well-formed formulae is a parallel to Proposition 4.1 and given by the following corollary, which is a direct consequence of Definitions 4.4 and 4.6 and Proposition 4.1. ( cannot be built or it doesn't help; moreover, the formula
is closed with respect to suffixes of Given a term
is the set of all fresh variables
. The intuitive explanation of the usefulness of
, in order to be able to make an input
To give an idee of how secrecy and authentication can be expressed in TSPL we present an example in Appendix A.
Computing Predecessors
We are interested in proving reachability properties of bounded timed cryptographic protocols. Given a property and an action 
to denote the predecessor of a formula
The purpose of this section is to show that
is effectively expressible in TSPL, when ¡ is a positive boolean combination of time constraints and term formulae of the form: distributes with respect to disjunction (finite or infinite). Moreover, it distributes over conjunction, finite and infinite, for discrete action (input or output). The main reason is that the only non-deterministic discrete action is input which gives raise to external non-determinism.
Time passing and time constraints
In this section, we show that the predecessor of r r ¢
t t , where
¢ is a time constraint, can be described by a TSPL formula. We consider the action $ c , i.e. time passing. The case of input and output actions is described above. We need first to define three kinds of normal forms for time constraints. Let we have:
Adding the right-hands of the equivalences yields the time constraint:
. One can prove that
has to be kept as we are interesting in the predecessors, thus the upper bound on the clocks must be satisfied as time only increases.
The general case Let us now return to the general case, where Let us define Pre 
Output action and atomic term formulae
is of the form 
¡ be a well-formed formula such that whenever
The main point here is the conjunct
which ensures that the intruder can derive a message that maches with the input term.
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Collecting the results together
It is easy to see that for any formula 
Decidability of TSPL
In this section, we prove decidability of the existence of a model for existential TSPL formulae (that is, formulae of the form
¡ with a quantifier free formula). Notice that since we showed in Section 5 that given a formula in TSPL and a bounded CP ¢ , one can compute Pre £ ¢ ! $ , decidability of the satisfiability of formulae yields a decision procedure for reachability of configurations described by TSPL formulae.
Second, we prove that the problem of deciding the existence of a model for an existential TSPL formula (shortly called TSPL-SAT) is ¥ -complete. Finally, we show that if we allow both existential and universal quantifiers for variables in , then the problem of deciding the existence of a model for a TSPL formula is undecidable.
A decidable fragment of TSPL
In this section, we do not consider formulae of the from is a fixed second-order variable that ranges over sets of messages, E is a meta-variable that ranges over the set of first-order variables, P is a meta-variable that ranges over ¦
To prove decidability for the satisfiability of TSPL formulae we follow a rule based approach (e.g., [20, 11] for two nice surveys) i.e.:
1. We introduce a set of formulae in solved form. For these formulae it is "easy" to decide whether a model exists.
2. We introduce a set of rewriting rules that transfom any formula into a set of solved formulae, such that is satisfiable iff one of the formulae in solved form is satisfiable.
3. We prove soundness and completeness of these rules.
4. We also prove their termination for a given control, i.e. that normal forms are reached and that normal forms are indeed in intermediate form.
The reduction of a formula into a set of solved formulae is done in three phases.
1. We define a preliminary form and we introduce a set of rewriting rules to transform any formula in the fragment that interest us, into a preliminary form. 
Solved form
A formula is called in solved form if it is syntactically equal to we denote the set of variables that appear in the term ( . We now show how one can check whether a formula in solved form has a model. Let us first assume that the time constraint is E , that is, we only have to deal with . We will later show how to reduce the general case to this one.
Satisfiability of
So, let a conjunction as above. We consider clocks and time variables as constant symbols and define a particular substitution`such that has a model iff it is satisfied by`. To do so, let 
this term is understood as 
The general case
Let us now return to the case where 
Rewriting rules
In this section, we present a set of rewriting rules that transfom any formula as considered in subsection 6.1, into a set of solved formulae, such that is satisfiable iff one the formulae in solved form is satisfiable. Saturate rules Rules (Sa1) and (Sa2) allow us to saturate a formula in intermediate form. 5 © (
is a fixed second-order variable that ranges over sets of messages, E is a meta-variable that ranges over the set of first-order variables, and (! 2 ( range over terms. It is easy to see that repeated application as much as possible of Transducer elimination and Preliminary rules transform any formula as considered in subsection 6.1, into an equivalent formula in preliminary form. From now on, it is obvious that as we consider satisfiability of formulae in preliminary form, we can restrict ourselves to conjunctions of literals. 
Intermediate form
There is an ordering
A formula in intermediate form defined as above, is called saturated, if is satisfiable.
From preliminary form to intermediate form Theorem 6.2 Application of the rules of Subsection 6.4 terminates in an intermediate form.
Proof: Let us first briefly mention how each rule contributes in reaching a normal form: It remains now to show that if no rule can be applied then the obtained formula is in indermediate form. This proof is easy and tedious and is left to the reader. 
Theorem 6.3 There exists a strategy to apply the rules of Subsection 6.4 that terminates in a saturated intermediate form.
Proof: To ensure the termination, we apply the Saturate rules Sa1 and Sa2 only for the pairs
that are not marked, and after the application of such a rule, we mark the corresponding pair. On the other hand, any time we apply the Replacement or the Occur-check rule, we unmark all the pairs of constraints which were marked before. Then, the termination follows from the remark that the number of variables is finite, all the rules but Replacement or Occur-check introduce only subformulae of the formulae we already have, and no rule does not introduce any new variable. Then, to prove that any formula obtained after the termination of the above algoritm is saturated, we make an induction on the position of variables w.r.t. to the order 
Complexity of the decidability of satisfiability of a TSPL-formula
In this subsection we prove that the problem of deciding the existence of a model for a TSPL formula (shortly called TSPL-SAT) is ¥ -complete. We define the size of a formula to be the size of its DAG representation. Roughly speaking, it is the cardinality of the set of its sub-formulae and sub-terms. We denote the size of Now we prove that TSPL-SAT is in ¥ . We only consider term formulae as the complexity of time constraints is well-konwn [28] . Moreover, as seen in Section 6.3 time constraints can be eliminated leading to a formula 
( ¥ "
), and such that
Then, the following result can be proved using a similar reasoning as in the Theorem 1 from [26] : 
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Undecidability for the entire TSPL logic
In this section we prove that the TSPL logic is undecidable, if we allow both existential and universal quantifiers. We show that Post's correspondence problem is reducible to the decision problem in our logic. The proof is inspired from [30] , where it is shown the undecidability of a certain fragment in the theory of free term algebras.
Theorem 6.4
Post's correspondence problem is reducible to the decision problem for the TSPL logic.
Proof: Let
be an instance of Post's correspondence problem, where
as constants, and also let Q be another particular constant. We shall denote 
The use of the function P will be clear later. Suppose that
. Then the formula ¡ given below is satisfiable, with the following value for
Conversely, if the formula is satisfiable, then from the value of
where 2. our model can also be extended to handle drifting clocks. It is well-known that models with clocks with drifts in bounded intervals can be transformed into models with perfect clocks modulo an abstraction, that is, taking into account more behavior. As discussed by Gong [18] drifting clocks can add subtle attacks.
3. in [7] , it is shown how we can use our logic to devise an abstract interpretation based method for unbounded protocols.
A Expressing security properties
To illustrate how TSPL can be used to express security properties, we consider the Needham-Schroeder publickey protocol, NS for short. The protocol is designed to ensure principal authentication: at the end of the protocol, the two participants A and B should be convinced about the identity of their respective correspondent. A session 
¢¦
There are many definitions of authentication that we can find in the literature [8, 31, 22, 27, 25] . We show here, by means of an example, how the introduced logic allows to specify the authentication properties discussed in [22] . Aliveness of the initiator is guaranteed to the participant 
. Using the induction hypothesis we have 
B.3 Definability of
where we denote by 
, and if
. Now we prove by induction on
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. By induction hypothesis, we have
is similar to the previous one. 
B.7 Computation of predecessors for a sequence of actions
In this subsection, we give an example that shows how we compute the set of predecessors with respect to a simple protocol. 
